Eval on CSV data allows arbitrary code execution in the ClassificationTaskValidate class
September 12, 2024

Products Impacted
This vulnerability is present in Autolabel v0.0.8 and newer.
CVSS Score: 7.8
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE Categorization
CWE-95: Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code (‘Eval Injection’)
Details
To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would create a malicious CSV file and share this as a dataset with the victim, who would load it for a classification task using AutoLabel. The vulnerability exists in the validate function of the ClassificationTaskValidate class in the autolabel/src/autolabel/dataset/validation.py file (shown below).
def validate(self, value: str):
"""Validate classification
A classification label(ground_truth) could either be a list or string
"""
# TODO: This can be made better
if value.startswith("[") and value.endswith("]"):
try:
seed_labels = eval(value)
if not isinstance(seed_labels, list):
raise
unmatched_label = set(seed_labels) - self.labels_set
if len(unmatched_label) != 0:
raise ValueError(
f"labels: '{unmatched_label}' not in prompt/labels provided in config "
)
except SyntaxError:
raise
else:
if value not in self.labels_set:
raise ValueError(
f"labels: '{value}' not in prompt/labels provided in config "
)When the user loads the malicious CSV file, the contents of the label_column value in each row are passed to the validate function of the class set with the task_type attribute. If the arguments are wrapped in brackets “[]”, they are passed into an eval function in the validate function of the ClassificationTaskValidate class in the autolabel/src/autolabel/dataset/validation.py file. This allows arbitrary code execution on the victim’s device. An example of a configuration and an example of a malicious CSV are shown below.
from autolabel import AutolabelDataset
config = {
"task_name": "ToxicCommentClassification",
"task_type": "classification", # classification task
"dataset": {
"label_column": "label",
},
"model": {
"provider": "openai",
"name": "gpt-3.5-turbo" # the model we want to use
},
"prompt": {
# very simple instructions for the LLM
"task_guidelines": "Does the provided comment contain 'toxic' language? Say toxic or not toxic.",
"labels": [ # list of labels to choose from
"label",
"not toxic"
],
"example_template": "Text Snippet: {example}\nClassification: {label}\n{label}"
}
}
AutolabelDataset('example.csv', config, validate=True)example_config.py
example,label
hello,[print('\n\n\ncode execution\n\n\n') for a in ['a']]example.csv
Related SAI Security Advisory
September 11, 2026
_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS_POSIX expansion adds 31 commands with no path checking, granting unconditional access to the full host filesystem
Mistral Vibe automatically approves a large set of commands that are not subject to the expected workspace path restrictions, allowing files anywhere on the host to be accessed without user approval.
September 11, 2026
Environment variable prefixes stripped from permission check enable RCE via env injection
Mistral Vibe does not consider environment variable assignments when checking whether a command can run without approval, allowing environment controlled behavior in allowlisted programs such as Git to be abused for arbitrary code execution.