Cloudpickle Load on Sklearn Model Load Leading to Code Execution
June 4, 2024

Products Impacted
This vulnerability was introduced in version 1.1.0 of MLflow.
CVSS Score: 8.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE Categorization
CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data.
Details
The vulnerability exists within the sklearn/__init__.py file, within the function _load_model_from_local_file. This is called when the mlflow.sklearn.load_model function is called.
def _load_model_from_local_file(path, serialization_format):
...
with open(path, "rb") as f:...
if serialization_format == SERIALIZATION_FORMAT_PICKLE:
return pickle.load(f)
elif serialization_format == SERIALIZATION_FORMAT_CLOUDPICKLE:
import cloudpickle
return cloudpickle.load(f)An attacker can exploit this by injecting a pickle object that will execute arbitrary code when deserialized into a model. The attacker can then call the sklearn.log_model() function to serialize this model and log it to the tracking server. By default, cloudpickle.load is used on deserialization when the model is loaded. The serialization format can be set to ‘pickle’ when the model is logged in order to force the use of pickle.load() when the model is loaded. In the below example, the pickle object has been injected into the init method of the ElasticNet class.
with mlflow.start_run():
lr = ElasticNet(alpha=alpha, l1_ratio=l1_ratio, random_state=42)
lr.fit(train_x, train_y)
...
# Either upload model which will use default format of cloudpickle
mlflow.sklearn.log_model(lr, artifact_path="model", registered_model_name="SklearnPickleDefault")
# Or upload model and set serialiazation format to pickle
mlflow.sklearn.log_model(lr, artifact_path="model", registered_model_name="SklearnPickleDefault", serialization_format='pickle'
)When the model is loaded by the victim (example code snippet below), the arbitrary code is executed on their machine:
import mlflow
...
logged_model = "models:/SklearnPickleDefault/1"
loaded_model = mlflow.sklearn.load_model(logged_model, dst_path='/tmp/sklearn_model')Related SAI Security Advisory
June 12, 2026
Post-Authentication RCE via update_collection
Any authenticated user with UPDATE_COLLECTION permission can achieve remote code execution by updating a collection's embedding function to reference a malicious HuggingFace model with trust_remote_code: true. The update_collection endpoint uses the same build_from_config() code path as CVE-2026-45829. Authentication runs before model loading, so this is not a pre-authentication issue, but the model instantiation itself is unguarded.
June 12, 2026
V1 API Tenant Isolation Bypass via Null Tenant/Database Context
All V1 collection-level endpoints pass None for tenant and database to the authorization layer, making tenant-scoped access control impossible through V1, regardless of which authorization provider is configured. V1 cannot be disabled. Combined with CVE-2026-45830, any authenticated user has unrestricted read/write access to any collection by UUID through V1 endpoints.