Pickle Load in Read Pandas Utility Function
June 4, 2024

Products Impacted
This vulnerability is present in Ydata-profiling v3.7.0 or newer.
CVSS Score: 7.8
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE Categorization
CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data.
Details
In src/ydata_profiling/utils/dataframe.py pickle is used to load serialized pandas datasets within the read_pandas util function:
def read_pandas(file_name: Path) -> pd.DataFrame:
"""Read DataFrame based on the file extension. This function is used when the file is in a standard format.
Various file types are supported (.csv, .json, .jsonl, .data, .tsv, .xls, .xlsx, .xpt, .sas7bdat, .parquet)
Args:
file_name: the file to read
Returns:
DataFrame
Notes:
This function is based on pandas IO tools:
https://pandas.pydata.org/pandas-docs/stable/user_guide/io.html
https://pandas.pydata.org/pandas-docs/stable/reference/io.html
This function is not intended to be flexible or complete. The main use case is to be able to read files without
user input, which is currently used in the editor integration. For more advanced use cases, the user should load
the DataFrame in code.
"""
extension = uncompressed_extension(file_name)
if extension == ".json":
df = pd.read_json(str(file_name))
elif extension == ".jsonl":
df = pd.read_json(str(file_name), lines=True)
elif extension == ".dta":
df = pd.read_stata(str(file_name))
elif extension == ".tsv":
df = pd.read_csv(str(file_name), sep="\t")
elif extension in [".xls", ".xlsx"]:
df = pd.read_excel(str(file_name))
elif extension in [".hdf", ".h5"]:
df = pd.read_hdf(str(file_name))
elif extension in [".sas7bdat", ".xpt"]:
df = pd.read_sas(str(file_name))
elif extension == ".parquet":
df = pd.read_parquet(str(file_name))
elif extension in [".pkl", ".pickle"]:
df = pd.read_pickle(str(file_name))While this function could be used by a user in code, the function is used by default when using the command line tool:

Related SAI Security Advisory
June 12, 2026
Post-Authentication RCE via update_collection
Any authenticated user with UPDATE_COLLECTION permission can achieve remote code execution by updating a collection's embedding function to reference a malicious HuggingFace model with trust_remote_code: true. The update_collection endpoint uses the same build_from_config() code path as CVE-2026-45829. Authentication runs before model loading, so this is not a pre-authentication issue, but the model instantiation itself is unguarded.
June 12, 2026
V1 API Tenant Isolation Bypass via Null Tenant/Database Context
All V1 collection-level endpoints pass None for tenant and database to the authorization layer, making tenant-scoped access control impossible through V1, regardless of which authorization provider is configured. V1 cannot be disabled. Combined with CVE-2026-45830, any authenticated user has unrestricted read/write access to any collection by UUID through V1 endpoints.