Eval on query parameters allows arbitrary code execution in ChromaDB integration
September 12, 2024

Products Impacted
This vulnerability is present in MindsDB versions v23.12.4.0 up to v24.7.4.1.
CVSS Score: 8.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE Categorization
CWE-95: Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code (‘Eval Injection’)
Details
To exploit this, an attacker must be authenticated to a MindsDB instance that has the ChromaDB integration installed. The vulnerability exists because the value provided for the metadata column in an ‘INSERT’ statement is passed into an eval statement in the insert function in the mindsdb/integrations/handlers/chromadb_handler/chromadb_handler.py file (shown below – edited to only include the relevant sections).
def insert(self, table_name: str, data: pd.DataFrame):
"""
Insert data into the ChromaDB database.
"""
collection = self._client.get_or_create_collection(name=table_name)
# drop columns with all None values
data.dropna(axis=1, inplace=True)
# ensure metadata is a dict, convert to dict if it is a string
if data.get(TableField.METADATA.value) is not None:
data[TableField.METADATA.value] = data[TableField.METADATA.value].apply(
lambda x: x if isinstance(x, dict) else eval(x)
)
...The eval function appears to be used for parsing valid Python data types from arbitrary user input but has the side effect of enabling arbitrary code execution because Python code can be passed to it via the method explained above.
Related SAI Security Advisory
June 12, 2026
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June 12, 2026
V1 API Tenant Isolation Bypass via Null Tenant/Database Context
All V1 collection-level endpoints pass None for tenant and database to the authorization layer, making tenant-scoped access control impossible through V1, regardless of which authorization provider is configured. V1 cannot be disabled. Combined with CVE-2026-45830, any authenticated user has unrestricted read/write access to any collection by UUID through V1 endpoints.