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Reflections on RSAC 2026: Moving Beyond Messaging and Sponsored Lists to Measurable AI Security

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Securing AI Agents: The Questions That Actually Matter

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The Hidden Risk of Agentic AI: What Happens Beyond the Prompt

Get all our Latest Research & Insights

Explore our glossary to get clear, practical definitions of the terms shaping AI security, governance, and risk management.

Research

Research
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AI Agents in Production: Security Lessons from Recent Incidents

Research
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LiteLLM Supply Chain Attack

Research
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Exploring the Security Risks of AI Assistants like OpenClaw

Research
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Agentic ShadowLogic

Videos

Report and Guides

Report and Guide
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2026 AI Threat Landscape Report

Register today to receive your copy of the report on March 18th and secure your seat for the accompanying webinar on April 8th.

Report and Guide
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Securing AI: The Technology Playbook

A practical playbook for securing, governing, and scaling AI applications for Tech companies.

Report and Guide
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Securing AI: The Financial Services Playbook

A practical playbook for securing, governing, and scaling AI systems in financial services.

HiddenLayer AI Security Research Advisory

CVE-2026-3071

Flair Vulnerability Report

An arbitrary code execution vulnerability exists in the LanguageModel class due to unsafe deserialization in the load_language_model method. Specifically, the method invokes torch.load() with the weights_only parameter set to False, which causes PyTorch to rely on Python’s pickle module for object deserialization.

CVE-2025-62354

Allowlist Bypass in Run Terminal Tool Allows Arbitrary Code Execution During Autorun Mode

When in autorun mode, Cursor checks commands sent to run in the terminal to see if a command has been specifically allowed. The function that checks the command has a bypass to its logic allowing an attacker to craft a command that will execute non-allowed commands.

CVE-2025-62353

Path Traversal in File Tools Allowing Arbitrary Filesystem Access

A path traversal vulnerability exists within Windsurf’s codebase_search and write_to_file tools. These tools do not properly validate input paths, enabling access to files outside the intended project directory, which can provide attackers a way to read from and write to arbitrary locations on the target user’s filesystem.

SAI-ADV-2025-012

Data Exfiltration from Tool-Assisted Setup

Windsurf’s automated tools can execute instructions contained within project files without asking for user permission. This means an attacker can hide instructions within a project file to read and extract sensitive data from project files (such as a .env file) and insert it into web requests for the purposes of exfiltration.

In the News

News
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HiddenLayer Unveils New Agentic Runtime Security Capabilities for Securing Autonomous AI Execution

News
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HiddenLayer Releases the 2026 AI Threat Landscape Report, Spotlighting the Rise of Agentic AI and the Expanding Attack Surface of Autonomous Systems

News
XX
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HiddenLayer’s Malcolm Harkins Inducted into the CSO Hall of Fame

Insights
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Reflections on RSAC 2026: Moving Beyond Messaging and Sponsored Lists to Measurable AI Security

Insights
xx
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Securing AI Agents: The Questions That Actually Matter

Insights
xx
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The Hidden Risk of Agentic AI: What Happens Beyond the Prompt

Insights
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Why Autonomous AI Is the Next Great Attack Surface

Insights
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Model Intelligence

Bringing Transparency to Third-Party AI Models

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Introducing Workflow-Aligned Modules in the HiddenLayer AI Security Platform

Modern AI environments don’t fail because of a single vulnerability. They fail when security can’t keep pace with how AI is actually built, deployed, and operated. That’s why our latest platform update represents more than a UI refresh. It’s a structural evolution of how AI security is delivered.

Insights
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Inside HiddenLayer’s Research Team: The Experts Securing the Future of AI

Every new AI model expands what’s possible and what’s vulnerable. Protecting these systems requires more than traditional cybersecurity. It demands expertise in how AI itself can be manipulated, misled, or attacked. Adversarial manipulation, data poisoning, and model theft represent new attack surfaces that traditional cybersecurity isn’t equipped to defend.

Insights
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Why Traditional Cybersecurity Won’t “Fix” AI

When an AI system misbehaves, from leaking sensitive data to producing manipulated outputs, the instinct across the industry is to reach for familiar tools: patch the issue, run another red team, test more edge cases.

Insights
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Securing AI Through Patented Innovation

As AI systems power critical decisions and customer experiences, the risks they introduce must be addressed. From prompt injection attacks to adversarial manipulation and supply chain threats, AI applications face vulnerabilities that traditional cybersecurity can’t defend against. HiddenLayer was built to solve this problem, and today, we hold one of the world’s strongest intellectual property portfolios in AI security.

Insights
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AI Discovery in Development Environments

AI is reshaping how organizations build and deliver software. From customer-facing applications to internal agents that automate workflows, AI is being woven into the code we develop and deploy in the cloud. But as the pace of adoption accelerates, most organizations lack visibility into what exactly is inside the AI systems they are building.

Insights
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Integrating AI Security into the SDLC

AI and ML systems are expanding the software attack surface in new and evolving ways, through model theft, adversarial evasion, prompt injection, data poisoning, and unsafe model artifacts. These risks can’t be fully addressed by traditional application security alone. They require AI-specific defenses integrated directly into the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC).

Insights
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Top 5 AI Threat Vectors in 2025

AI is powering the next generation of innovation. Whether driving automation, enhancing customer experiences, or enabling real-time decision-making, it has become inseparable from core business operations. However, as the value of AI systems grows, so does the incentive to exploit them.

Webinars

Offensive and Defensive Security for Agentic AI

Webinars

How to Build Secure Agents

Webinars

Beating the AI Game, Ripple, Numerology, Darcula, Special Guests from Hidden Layer… – Malcolm Harkins, Kasimir Schulz – SWN #471

Webinars

HiddenLayer Webinar: 2024 AI Threat Landscape Report

Webinars

HiddenLayer Model Scanner

Webinars

HiddenLayer Webinar: A Guide to AI Red Teaming

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HiddenLayer Webinar: Accelerating Your Customer's AI Adoption

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HiddenLayer: AI Detection Response for GenAI

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HiddenLayer Webinar: Women Leading Cyber

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Report and Guide
xx
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2026 AI Threat Landscape Report

Report and Guide
xx
min read

Securing AI: The Technology Playbook

Report and Guide
xx
min read

Securing AI: The Financial Services Playbook

Report and Guide
xx
min read

AI Threat Landscape Report 2025

Report and Guide
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HiddenLayer Named a Cool Vendor in AI Security

Report and Guide
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A Step-By-Step Guide for CISOS

Report and Guide
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AI Threat landscape Report 2024

Report and Guide
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HiddenLayer and Intel eBook

Report and Guide
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Forrester Opportunity Snapshot

Report and Guide
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Gartner® Report: 3 Steps to Operationalize an Agentic AI Code of Conduct for Healthcare CIOs

news
xx
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HiddenLayer Unveils New Agentic Runtime Security Capabilities for Securing Autonomous AI Execution

news
xx
min read

HiddenLayer Releases the 2026 AI Threat Landscape Report, Spotlighting the Rise of Agentic AI and the Expanding Attack Surface of Autonomous Systems

news
xx
min read

HiddenLayer’s Malcolm Harkins Inducted into the CSO Hall of Fame

news
xx
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HiddenLayer Selected as Awardee on $151B Missile Defense Agency SHIELD IDIQ Supporting the Golden Dome Initiative

news
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HiddenLayer Announces AWS GenAI Integrations, AI Attack Simulation Launch, and Platform Enhancements to Secure Bedrock and AgentCore Deployments

news
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HiddenLayer Joins Databricks’ Data Intelligence Platform for Cybersecurity

news
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HiddenLayer Appoints Chelsea Strong as Chief Revenue Officer to Accelerate Global Growth and Customer Expansion

news
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HiddenLayer Listed in AWS “ICMP” for the US Federal Government

news
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New TokenBreak Attack Bypasses AI Moderation with Single-Character Text Changes

news
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Beating the AI Game, Ripple, Numerology, Darcula, Special Guests from Hidden Layer… – Malcolm Harkins, Kasimir Schulz – SWN #471

news
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All Major Gen-AI Models Vulnerable to ‘Policy Puppetry’ Prompt Injection Attack

news
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One Prompt Can Bypass Every Major LLM’s Safeguards

SAI Security Advisory

Eval on query parameters allows arbitrary code execution in SharePoint integration list creation

An attacker authenticated to a MindsDB instance with the SharePoint integration installed can execute arbitrary Python code on the server. This can be achieved by creating a database built with the SharePoint engine and running an ‘INSERT’ query against it to create a list, where the value given for the ‘list’ parameter would contain the code to be executed. This code is passed to an eval function used for parsing valid Python data types from arbitrary user input but will run the arbitrary code contained within the query.

SAI Security Advisory

Eval on query parameters allows arbitrary code execution in ChromaDB integration

An attacker authenticated to a MindsDB instance with the ChromaDB integration installed can execute arbitrary Python code on the server. This can be achieved by creating a database built with the ChromaDB engine and running an ‘INSERT’ query against it, where the value given for ‘metadata’ would contain the code to be executed. This code is passed to an eval function used for parsing valid Python data types from arbitrary user input but will run the arbitrary code contained within the query.

SAI Security Advisory

Eval on query parameters allows arbitrary code execution in Vector Database integrations

An attacker authenticated to a MindsDB instance with any one of several integrations installed can execute arbitrary Python code on the server. This can be achieved by creating a database built with the specified integration engine and running an ‘UPDATE’ query against it, containing the code to execute. This code is passed to an eval function used for parsing valid Python data types from arbitrary user input but will run any arbitrary Python code contained within the value given in the ‘SET embeddings =’ part of the query.

SAI Security Advisory

Eval on query parameters allows arbitrary code execution in Weaviate integration

An attacker authenticated to a MindsDB instance with the Weaviate integration installed can execute arbitrary Python code on the server. This can be achieved by creating a database built with the Weaviate engine and running a ‘SELECT WHERE’ clause against it, containing the code to execute. This code is passed to an eval function used for parsing valid Python data types from arbitrary user input, but it will run any arbitrary Python code contained within the value given in the ‘WHERE embeddings =’ part of the clause.

SAI Security Advisory

Unsafe deserialization in Datalab leads to arbitrary code execution

An attacker can place a malicious file called datalabs.pkl within a directory and send that directory to a victim user. When the victim user loads the directory with Datalabs.load, the datalabs.pkl within it is deserialized and any arbitrary code contained within it is executed.

SAI Security Advisory

Eval on CSV data allows arbitrary code execution in the MLCTaskValidate class

An attacker can craft a CSV file containing Python code in one of the values. This code must be wrapped in brackets to work i.e. []. The maliciously crafted CSV file can then be shared with a victim user as a dataset. When the user creates a multilabel classification task, the CSV is loaded and passed through a validation function, where values wrapped in brackets are passed into an eval function, which will execute the Python code contained within.

SAI Security Advisory

Eval on CSV data allows arbitrary code execution in the ClassificationTaskValidate class

An attacker can craft a CSV file containing Python code in one of the values. This code must be wrapped in brackets to work i.e. []. The maliciously crafted CSV file can then be shared with a victim user as a dataset. When the user creates a classification task, the CSV is loaded and passed through a validation function, where values wrapped in brackets are passed into an eval function, which will execute the Python code contained within.

SAI Security Advisory

Safe_eval and safe_exec allows for arbitrary code execution

Execution of arbitrary code can be achieved via the safe_eval and safe_exec functions of the llama-index-experimental/llama_index/experimental/exec_utils.py Python file. The functions allow the user to run untrusted code via an eval or exec function while only permitting whitelisted functions. However, an attacker can leverage the whitelisted pandas.read_pickle function or other 3rd party library functions to achieve arbitrary code execution. This can be exploited in the Pandas Query Engine.

SAI Security Advisory

Exec on untrusted LLM output leading to arbitrary code execution on Evaporate integration

The safe_eval and safe_exec functions are intended to allow the user to run untrusted code in an eval or exec function while disallowing dangerous functions. However, an attacker can use 3rd party library functions to get arbitrary code execution.

SAI Security Advisory

Crafted WiFI network name (SSID) leads to arbitrary command injection

A command injection vulnerability exists in Wyze Cam V4 firmware versions up to and including 4.52.4.9887. An attacker within Bluetooth range of the camera can leverage this command to execute arbitrary commands as root during the camera setup process.

SAI Security Advisory

Deserialization of untrusted data leading to arbitrary code execution

Execution of arbitrary code can be achieved through the deserialization process in the tensorflow_probability/python/layers/distribution_layer.py file within the function _deserialize_function. An attacker can inject a malicious pickle object into an HDF5 formatted model file, which will be deserialized via pickle when the model is loaded, executing the malicious code on the victim machine. An attacker can achieve this by injecting a pickle object into the DistributionLambda layer of the model under the make_distribution_fn key.

SAI Security Advisory

Pickle Load on Sklearn Model Load Leading to Code Execution Copy

An attacker can inject a malicious pickle object into a scikit-learn model file and log it to the MLflow tracking server via the API. When a victim user calls the mlflow.sklearn.load_model function on the model, the pickle file is deserialized on their system, running any arbitrary code it contains.

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